

Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 BONN 06860 01 OF 05 140154Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10
L-03 ACDA-12 NSAE-00 PA-02 SS-15 SP-02 TRSE-00
NRC-07 NSCE-00 /069 W
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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE
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CINC EUR VAHINGEN IMMEDIATE
CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG IMMEDIATE
CINC USAFE RAMSTEIN IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 06860

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PAGE 02 BONN 06860 01 OF 05 140154Z

E.O. 11652: N/A
SUBJECT: SECRETARY BROWN'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN BONN,
APRIL 13, 1978

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY BROWN'S
AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, HANS APEL'S PRESS CONFERENCE

IN BONN, HELD AT 19:15 HRS. ON APRIL 13:

2. QUESTION (TRANSLATED): MR. BROWN, ON THE ONE HAND YOU ASK THE EUROPEANS, AND ALSO THE GERMANS, FOR AN EARLY DECISION ON THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AWACS. WHY ARE YOU THEN, ON THE OTHER HAND, NOT PREPARED TO GO THE "TWO-WAY STREET" THAT THE EUROPEANS CALL FOR AND DESIRE, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH THE LOW-LEVEL ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEM GEPARD. YOU OBVIOUSLY ARE NOT EVEN PREPARED TO ACQUIRE SUCH A SYSTEM.

3. SECDEF: THE AWACS DECISION IS ABOUT A SYSTEM THAT HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE ALLIANCE FOR THREE YEARS, AT LEAST. IT'S HARDLY A SUDDEN DECISION THAT IS BEING CALLED FOR. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PRODUCING THIS AIRCRAFT FOR SEVERAL YEARS ALREADY. AND IF THE ALLIANCE DOES DECIDE TO ACQUIRE IT FOR THE DEFENSE OF NATO TERRITORY AGAINST LOW-LEVEL AIR ATTACK, THE RIGHT TIME TO DO SO IS WHILE THE PRODUCTION LINE IS STILL OPEN. GEPARD AS A SUGGESTED ANTI-AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY FOR AMERICAN FORCES IS AN IDEA THAT CAME UP DURING THIS PAST YEAR. INDEED, IT'S AN IDEA THAT I HAD MYSELF. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LOOK AT IT CAREFULLY, AND I MUST SAY THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LOOK AT ITS PRICE VERY CAREFULLY. THE PRICE, PARTLY AS A
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PAGE 03 BONN 06860 01 OF 05 140154Z

CONSEQUENCE OF THE DOLLAR-MARK EXCHANGE RATIO IS VERY HIGH, AND THAT'S NOT A MATTER OF BLAME FOR ANYONE. THE MARK TO DOLLAR RATIO IS WHAT IT IS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. THAT MAKES IT IN MY MIND VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE AN AFFIRMATIVE DECISION UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HERE, OF COURSE, IS A SINGLE DECISION FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE, WHEREAS AWACS IS SOMETHING THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS TO DECIDE AS A WHOLE. BUT GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD MAKE THE LARGEST PURCHASES, OR THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTIONS, BY FAR.

4. APEL (TRANSLATED): I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME ADDITIONAL REMARKS. ON ONE POINT I EXPRESSLY AGREE WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE: THERE IS SOMETHING LIKE A CONTINUITY OF APPROACH, OF DEBATE; ALSO OF POSITIVE OPINION ON THE GERMAN SIDE. AND NOBODY, INCLUDING THE NEW GERMAN DEFENSE MINISTER, MAY AND WILL BREAK AWAY FROM THIS CONTINUITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE THAT YESTERDAY FOR THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE POINT IN THE TWO PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES CON-

CERNED, THE DEFENSE AND THE BUDGET COMMITTEES. AND
THAT THIS, OF COURSE, IS NOT GOING TO BE A SETTLED
AFFAIR FOR SOME TIME TO COME FOR BOTH COMMITTEES.
OUR PARLIAMENT, AS IS THE CASE IN THE UNITED STATES,
HAS THE FINAL SAY ON PROCUREMENT PROJECTS OF THIS
ORDER. THE TWO COMMITTEES HAVE THEREFORE FIRST ASKED
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO

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PAGE 01 BONN 06860 02 OF 05 140203Z
ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10
L-03 ACDA-12 NSAE-00 PA-02 SS-15 SP-02 TRSE-00
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 06860

USICA

JUDGE AND EXAMINE ON THEIR OWN THE MILITARY VALUE OF
AWACS. SECOND, THEY HAVE ASKED ME TO DISCUSS THE
SUBJECT OF COMPENSATION WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE,
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PAGE 02 BONN 06860 02 OF 05 140203Z

INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE, THE GEPARD; BUT (I WAS ALSO
ASKED TO INQUIRE) WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE GERMAN
FINANCING OF AWACS WOULD FLOW BACK TO THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC IN THE FORM OF ORDERS TO CREATE JOBS. FINALLY,
AS A THIRD POINT, WE WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO DISCUSS
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE THE COST-SHARING FACTOR. AT PRESENT
NATO ASSESSES US NEARLY A THIRD. THAT HONORS US VERY
MUCH OF COURSE, BUT BUSINESS IS BUSINESS. AND THIS IS
THUS A THIRD FIELD OF DEBATE THAT WE HAVE TO TACKLE.
I HAVE ALREADY STATED PUBLICLY THAT I VIEW THE PRO-
CUREMENT OF THIS SYSTEM QUITE POSITIVELY, ESPECIALLY FOR
MILITARY POLICY REASONS AND FOR REASONS CONNECTED WITH
THE ALLIANCE. BUT I TOO HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES AND MUST CONVINCE THEM THAT
THIS PROCUREMENT IS REASONABLE ALL THE MORE SO SINCE ALL
MEMBERS OF THE BUDGET COMMITTEE, ESPECIALLY ITS CHAIRMAN,
CONTRARY TO THE DEFENSE COMMITTEE, MADE IT VERY CLEAR
TO ME YESTERDAY THAT SAYING YES TO AWACS MEANS STRETCHING
PROCUREMENTS ON WHICH A DECISION HAS ALREADY
BEEN PASSED. NOW THIS IS NOT SO DIFFICULT FOR THE
GERMAN SHARE IN MEDIUM-TERM FINANCIAL PLANNING WOULD BE
BELOW THE ENVISAGED INVESTMENT SUM. THIS MEANS, IN
OTHER WORDS, THAT WHAT WE WOULD EXPECT OF THE GERMAN
ARMED FORCES MAY BE EXPECTED OF THEM AND WOULD NOT
CURTAIL THE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE CAPABILITY OF OUR
COUNTRY. BUT HERE AGAIN, AND I SAY THIS QUITE OPENLY,
WHAT IS ALSO AT STAKE ARE JOBS.

BRIEFLY TOLD, I WILL ALSO STEP UP THE AWACS DEBATE IN A
WAY THAT IS FITTING TO THE CAUSE AND TO THE NEED FOR
COMING TO A DECISION. BUT CONTRARY TO THE THINGS THAT
WE DECIDE OURSELVES AT THE MINISTRY, I CANNOT FORCE THE
PARLIAMENT (TO A DECISION). I CAN ONLY ASK THE
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PAGE 03 BONN 06860 02 OF 05 140203Z

PARLIAMENT NOT TO DISREGARD THE MILITARY POLICY ASPECTS
AND THOSE AFFECTING THE ALLIANCE. THIS MEANS IN OTHER
WORDS THAT WE HAVE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED AWACS TODAY AND
HAVE PRESENTED THE PROBLEMS. MY COLLEAGUE BROWN IS WELL
AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS. HE ALSO HAS PROBLEMS WITH HIS
CONGRESS. WE SHALL SEE HOW FAST AND HOW WELL WE WILL

MAKE PROGRESS.

5. QUESTION (TRANSLATED): WILL THERE BE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEUTRON BOMB? (INAUDIBLE)

6. SECDEF: THE NEUTRON WEAPON, OR ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON, HAS, AS A MILITARY WEAPON, CAPABILITIES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST MASS TANK ATTACKS THAT GO BEYOND THOSE OF OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN THAT SENSE IT IS A USEFUL, MILITARY CAPABILITY AND IT MUST BE SO REGARDED. IT IS NOT THE ONLY WAY, BY ANY MEANS, TO DEFEND AGAINST TANKS. IT IS A COST-EFFECTIVE WAY. THE ALLIANCE HAS BEEN PROCEEDING WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF VARIOUS KINDS OF ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, INCLUDING PRECISION-GUIDED ANTI-TANK MISSILES, MINES, AND OTHER ADVANCED SYSTEMS, AND PROCURING THEM IN LARGE NUMBERS. IT WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE ALLIANCE WILL ALSO HAVE THE BENEFIT IN FUTURE OF IMPROVED TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS, WHICH WILL BE USABLE AGAINST INVADING MILITARY FORCES, INCLUDING TANK FORMATIONS. THESE WEAPONS WILL BE DEPLOYED WITHOUT AN ENHANCED RADIATION FEATURE, BUT THEY WILL BE DESIGNED SO THAT THAT FEATURE COULD BE ADDED ON SHORT NOTICE IF SUCH A DECISION IS TAKEN. SUCH A DECISION WILL DEPEND STRONGLY ON WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION RESPONDS TO THIS PARTICULAR ACTION OF RESTRAINT BY ACTIONS OF ITS OWN THAT WILL RESTRAIN OR LIMIT ITS CAPABILITIES IN TERMS OF POTENTIAL OR ACTUAL THREATS, SYSTEMS THREATENING WESTERN EUROPE. SUCH SYSTEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 BONN 06860 02 OF 05 140203Z

AS NUMBER OF TANKS, OR MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, LIKE THE SS-20.

7. QUESTION (TRANSLATED): THIS THING ABOUT AWACS AND GEPARD SEEMS TO ME TO (SIGNAL) A NEW ROUND HERE IN A DISPUTE OVER EARLY COORDINATION IN THE PLANNING OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS ... (INAUDIBLE). LAST YEAR WE HAD A DISPUTE OVER THE STANDARDIZATION OF TANKS IN NATO. MY QUESTION TO YOU, WHICH VALUE HAS THE ALLIANCE VIS-A-VIS THE FULLY STANDARDIZED WARSAW PACT (INAUDIBLE)?

8. SECDEF: IF THE ALLIANCE IS TO, AS IT MUST, OPERATE

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PAGE 01 BONN 06860 03 OF 05 140208Z

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10

L-03 ACDA-12 NSAE-00 PA-02 SS-15 SP-02 TRSE-00

NRC-07 NSCE-00 /069 W

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 06860

USICA

EFFICIENTLY BOTH IN THE PROCUREMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS ON THE ONE HAND AND ON THEIR STANDARDIZATION OR INTEROPERABILITY AS FIGHTING SYSTEMS
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PAGE 02 BONN 06860 03 OF 05 140208Z

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WILL HAVE TO WORK MUCH MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER ON BOTH OF THESE ASPECTS THAN THEY HAVE. THE ALLIANCE CANNOT AFFORD THE

INEFFICIENCIES THAT WILL EXIST IF WE PRODUCE
DUPLICATIVE SYSTEMS THAT DON'T OPERATE WELL TOGETHER.
TO TAKE THE SIMPLEST EXAMPLE: IF OUR MILITARY
COMMANDERS CANNOT COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER BECAUSE
EACH IS USING A TELEPHONE THAT IS NOT ONLY OF DIFFERENT
MANUFACTURE BUT WHICH DOES NOT CONNECT WITH THE OTHER
TELEPHONES, OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES WILL BE VERY
LIMITED INDEED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE INSTITUTIONAL
SITUATION WITHIN EACH OF OUR COUNTRIES, NOT ONLY THE
U.S. AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, BUT ALL OF THE NATO
COUNTRIES WHICH ARE FREE COUNTRIES, FREE IN THE
ALLIANCE, THAT INSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IS SUCH THAT NO
COUNTRY WILL BE WILLING SIMPLY TO BE A PURCHASER OF
EQUIPMENT PRODUCED IN THE OTHER. THAT MEANS THAT WE MUST
MOVE TOWARD A CLOSER COOPERATION THAT I MENTIONED.

LAST YEAR, AS YOU MENTIONED, THE TANK GUN ON THE MAIN
BATTLE TANK BECAME A VERY SERIOUS ISSUE, AND THE
UNITED STATES DECIDED TO ADOPT FOR THE BULK OF ITS NEW
MAIN BATTLE TANK, MAIN BATTLE TANKS, THE GERMAN DESIGN
FOR A 120-MM TANK GUN. THAT WILL ALLOW INTEROPERABILITY,
WE CAN USE EACH OTHERS AMMUNITION, AND IT REDUCES THE
NEED FOR NEW DESIGN, U.S. DESIGN, THAT WOULD BE WASTE-
FUL. WE HAVE, TO TAKE ANOTHER EXAMPLE, AUTHORIZED THE
PROCUREMENT OF A LARGE NUMBER OF GERMAN VEHICLES,
GERMAN-MADE VEHICLES, FOR ADMINISTRATIVE USE BY
U.S. FORCES. WE NEED TO HAVE A "TWO-WAY STREET."

AND THESE ARE EXAMPLES OF OUR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THAT
"TWO-WAY STREET." I AM SURE THERE WILL BE MORE, BUT THE
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PAGE 03 BONN 06860 03 OF 05 140208Z

MORE COMPLICATED THEY ARE THE MORE THEY NEED TO BE
PLANNED IN ADVANCE. WE NEED IN THE NEXT GENERATION OF
MUNITIONS FOR DELIVERY BY AIRCRAFT, AIR-TO-GROUND
MUNITIONS. TO SEE TO IT THAT ONE COUNTRY PRODUCES,
DESIGNS AND PRODUCES, THE AIR-TO-GROUND MUNITIONS
AGAINST TANKS, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE
ALLIANCE. OR IF IT DOES NOT PRODUCE THEM ALL, AT LEAST
IT DESIGNS THEM AND PRODUCES THE FIRST LARGE QUANTITY.
CO-PRODUCTION IS, UNDOUBTEDLY, A PARTIAL ANSWER HERE.
ANOTHER COUNTRY COULD DESIGN THE AIR-TO-GROUND
MUNITIONS TARGETED AGAINST RADARS, FOR EXAMPLE, AND SO
ON. THAT IS MY EXPECTATION FOR THE DISTANT FUTURE. IN
THE MEANTIME, WHAT'S IMPORTANT, I BELIEVE, IS THAT THE
ALLIANCE BUY THE BEST KIND OF EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE FOR
EACH PARTICULAR PURPOSE, AND THAT WE ARRANGE, TO THE
MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, TO BUY WHAT'S BEST EVEN THOUGH
SOMEONE ELSE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED IT. THAT'S HOW WE
FELT ABOUT THE TANK GUNS, AND THAT'S HOW WE FELT

ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE VEHICLES, THAT'S HOW WE FEEL
ABOUT THE AWACS.

9. QUESTION (TRANSLATED): DOES THE UNITED STATES FEEL
THAT, IN ITS DECISION ON THE NEUTRON WEAPON, IT WAS LEFT
ALONE BY THE EUROPEANS?

10. SECDEF: THE DECISION ON THE PRODUCTION OF THE
ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON - THE NEUTRON BOMB - HAS
ALWAYS BEEN SEEN BY US TO BE THE DECISION FOR THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENT. MANY CONSULTATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE
WITH MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IN CAPITALS AND IN
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
MEETINGS. I BELIEVE THAT THE DECISION FINALLY REACHED,
WHICH HAS BEEN DISCUSSED AT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THAT DECISION EXPRESSED BY THE
MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES GROUP, IS A
CORRECT ONE. IT LEAVES OPEN THE OPTION FOR LATER
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PAGE 04 BONN 06860 03 OF 05 140208Z

PRODUCTION. IT PUTS ON THE SOVIET UNION THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR AN APPROPRIATE ARMS CONTROL RESPONSE.
AND THE UNITED STATES IS GOING AHEAD WITH
MODERNIZATION OF ITS TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE
BELIEVE OUR ALLIES UNDERSTAND OUR POSITION, WE UNDER-
STAND THEIRS. AND IN THIS DECISION WE ARE TOGETHER.

11. QUESTION (TRANSLATED): AS A FORMER PARTICIPANT IN
THE SALT TALKS, MR. SECRETARY, YOU BECAME FAMILIAR
WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS NEGOTIATING PARTNER. DO YOU
SEE ANY CHANCES WHATSOEVER, OR DO YOU HAVE THE HOPE THAT

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PAGE 01 BONN 06860 04 OF 05 140213Z
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10
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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 06860

USICA

THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ACCEPT AN UNPRODUCED NEUTRON
WEAPON AS AN OBJECT OF NEGOTIATION? (INAUDIBLE)

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PAGE 02 BONN 06860 04 OF 05 140213Z

12.SECDEF: IN THE FIRST PLACE THE NEUTRON WEAPON IS
A TACTICAL WEAPON, NOT A STRATEGIC ONE. IT THEREFORE
HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS.
TO THE DEGREE THAT THE SOVIETS SUGGEST THAT THE PROPER
RESPONSE TO A DEFERRAL OF PRODUCTION, OF A PRODUCTION
DECISION, FOR THE NEUTRON WEAPON ON THE PART OF THE
UNITED STATES IS A SIMILAR ASSERTION BY THEMSELVES THAT
THEY WILL NOT BE PRODUCING THE NEUTRON WEAPON, THAT'S
AN UNSATISFACTORY RESPONSE. IT'S AN UNSATISFACTORY
RESPONSE FOR TWO REASONS. ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS
ARE VALUABLE PRINCIPALLY AS A WAY OF ATTACKING OR
COMBATTING AN INVADING TANK ARMY, A CONTINGENCY AGAINST
WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO PARTICULAR REASON TO
PREPARE. IN THE SECOND PLACE, WHETHER ENHANCED
RADIATION WEAPONS ARE BEING PRODUCED AND DEPLOYED OR
NOT IS NOT A FACT THAT CAN BE DETERMINED BY NATIONAL

MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IN THE CASE OF THE UNITED STATES IT CAN BE VERIFIED BECAUSE WHAT WE ARE DOING IS AVAILABLE THROUGH OUR NEWSPAPERS. IN FACT, THAT IS HOW THE WHOLE QUESTION OF THE NEUTRON BOMB FIRST BECAME KNOWN. IN THE CASE OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT'S NOT THE SITUATION, AND THERE IS NO WAY OF TELLING WHETHER THEY WOULD BE, OR HAVE BEEN, OR ARE PRODUCING AND DEPLOYING ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS.

13. QUESTION : MR. SECRETARY, IN RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF CONCERN - NOT CONCERN BUT COMMENTARY - IN LEGISLATURES AND IN THE PRESS BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON OVER A SERIES OF DECISIONS INVOLVING THE BL-BOMBER AND THE NAVY-SHIP-BUILDING PROGRAM AND THE NEUTRON WEAPON. I WONDER IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS TODAY WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND WITH MINISTER APEL WHETHER YOU'VE HEARD ANY EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER THE AMERICAN UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 BONN 06860 04 OF 05 140213Z

DEFENSE POSTURE GENERALLY AND OVER THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN WASHINGTON?

14. SECDEF: I HAVE HEARD IN MY MEETINGS TODAY NO EXPRESSION OF LACK OF CONFIDENCE THAT AMERICAN DECISIONS ABOUT OUR WEAPONS PROGRAM ARE SUCH AS TO PRESERVE A BALANCE WITH THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES, NOR DID I HEAR ANY CONCERN EXPRESSED THAT OUR DECISIONS ON OUR DEFENSE PROGRAMS ARE NOT PRODUCING AN ADEQUATE MILITARY CAPABILITY.

15. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THE CHANCELLOR SAID YESTERDAY THAT DECISIONS ON THE DOLLAR AND THE NEUTRON WEAPON HAVE BEEN CAUSE OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DISQUIET IN EUROPE. IN YOUR MEETINGS WITH MR. APEL AND THE CHANCELLOR TODAY DID YOU MAKE ANY EFFORTS TO DISPEL ANY OF WHAT THE CHANCELLOR DESCRIBED AS "DIS-QUIET?"

16. SECDEF: MY DISCUSSIONS TODAY AND MY PRESENTATIONS TODAY WERE CERTAINLY DESIGNED TO ASSURE MY GERMAN COLLEAGUES THAT AMERICAN DECISIONS ON THESE MATTERS ARE MADE WITH THE INTENTION AND, WE BELIEVE, THE EFFECT OF ASSURING SECURITY AND ASSURING THE STRENGTH, NOT ONLY OF THE UNITED STATES BUT OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

17. QUESTION: MR. BROWN, WE HAVE HEARD A VARIETY OF DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NEUTRON WEAPON OR WARHEAD. WE HAVE HEARD ON SOME OCCASIONS THAT IT WAS MEANT TO KILL ENEMY SOLDIERS WHILE PRESERVING PROPERTY AND REAL ESTATE.

YOU TELL US TODAY THAT IT IS ALSO PRIMARILY COST-EFFECTIVE. AND YET WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES IT IS A MARKER THAT'S NOT TO BE PLAYED IN THIS INTERNATIONAL POKER GAME. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE NEUTRON WEAPON?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 BONN 06860 04 OF 05 140213Z

18. SECDEF: I HAVE SEEN SO MANY STATEMENTS ABOUT IT THAT I HAVE BEGUN TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS A CONSTRUCT OF THE MEDIA. BUT MY DESCRIPTION OF IT WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS: IT IS A NUCLEAR WEAPON WHOSE EFFECTS ARE SUCH THAT IT REDUCES THE BLAST AND THE FIRE PRODUCING EMISSIONS TO A LOWER LEVEL. THE RESULT IS THAT ALL OF THOSE LETHAL EFFECTS ARE CONFINED TO A RELATIVELY SMALL RADIUS AND ARE ABOUT EQUAL IN THE RADIUS OF THEIR EFFECT. THE RESULT OF THAT IS THAT IT CAN BE USED TO ATTACK A HARD TARGET LIKE A TANK COLUMN, DESTROY IT,

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PAGE 01 BONN 06860 05 OF 05 140218Z
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CINC USAF RAMSTEIN IMMEDIATE
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UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 06860

USICA

AND PRODUCE RELATIVELY LITTLE IN THE WAY OF
CASUALTIES TO PEOPLE AND DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS
WHICH, IN THE CASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OFTEN ARE THE
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 BONN 06860 05 OF 05 140218Z

PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE DEATHS OF PEOPLE BY FALLING ON
THEM OUTSIDE OF THAT RADIUS. FOR THAT REASON IT CAN BE
USED CLOSER TO FRIENDLY TROOPS AND TO CIVILIANS THAN
NORMAL, THAN ORDINARY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND STILL
ACCOMPLISH ITS MILITARY MISSION. THAT MAKES IT A
MILITARILY USEFUL WEAPON. IT DOES NOT MAKE IT THE
SOLUTION TO ALL MILITARY OR OTHER PROBLEMS.

19. QUESTION: DOES THIS WEAPON THEREFORE LOWER OR
RAISE THE SO-CALLED NUCLEAR THRESHOLD?

20. SECDEF: IN MY VIEW IT DOES NOT LOWER IT; I DON'T
THINK IT PARTICULARLY RAISES IT EITHER. IN FACT,
THE DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH IN THE CASE
OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE TAKEN ONLY BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, IS A VERY GRAVE ONE.
IT CROSSES A VERY SIGNIFICANT THRESHOLD, AND I DON'T
THINK THAT FROM MY EXPERIENCE OF HOW AMERICAN PRESIDENTS
DEAL WITH THESE MATTERS, THAT THE SOMEWHAT LOWER
CASUALTIES TO CIVILIANS OR FRIENDLY FORCES TO BE
EXPECTED FROM THE USE OF AN ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON
WOULD MAKE THAT AN EASIER DECISION FOR AN AMERICAN
PRESIDENT.

21. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE BEEN QUOTED AS
SAYING THAT PERHAPS THE WHOLE MANNER IN WHICH WASHING-
TON HANDLED THE NEUTRON DECISION WAS PERHAPS LESS THAN
DIPLOMATIC. IS THAT A FAIRLY ACCURATE QUOTE AND, IF SO,
COULD YOU ELABORATE?

22. SECDEF: IT IS NOT QUITE AN ACCURATE QUOTATION, I BELIEVE, THAT WHAT I SAID ON THAT OCCASION WAS THAT, IN RETROSPECT, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE COME OUT WITH UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 03 BONN 06860 05 OF 05 140218Z

A GOOD DECISION, IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN HANDLED BETTER. THERE WERE A GREAT MANY GOVERNMENTS AND A GREAT MANY INDIVIDUALS, A GREAT MANY INSTITUTIONS, INCLUDING THE PRESS AS WELL AS THE GOVERNMENT INVOLVED. AND I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK FOR ANY OF THEM OR JUDGE ANY OF THEM. I ONLY EXPRESS AN OPINION THAT I THINK I COULD HAVE DONE BETTER ON OCCASION.

23. QUESTION (TRANSLATED): NOW A QUESTION FOR BOTH GENTLEMEN: WHICH POSSIBILITIES DO YOU SEE TO INCORPORATE THE NEUTRON WEAPON INTO THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS?

24. SECDEF: IF YOU SPEAK SPECIFICALLY OF MBFR IT SEEMS TO ME THAT SOME OF THE TOPICS THAT ARE INCLUDED IN MBFR MIGHT ALSO BE DISCUSSED IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEUTRON BOMB. BUT I DON'T THINK THAT THE NEUTRON BOMB FITS VERY NATURALLY INTO THE MBFR DISCUSSIONS OVERALL BECAUSE IT IS A VERY PARTICULAR KIND OF WEAPON. ONE WOULD, I THINK, HAVE TO GO BEYOND, ON THE SOVIET SIDE, ITEMS COVERED IN MBFR TO FIND AN APPROPRIATE OFFSET. I DON'T RULE IT OUT ENTIRELY BUT IT IS NOT A NATURAL CONNECTION.

25. APEL (TRANSLATED): WHAT MATTERS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE NATO GROUP DISCUSSIONS - TWO WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE NATO SUMMIT, WITH THE FIRST MEETING SCHEDULED NEXT WEEK IN DENMARK - THERE WILL BE AMPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO FURTHER DEVELOP THE ARMS CONTROL OUTLINE THAT THE NATO COUNCIL HAS DEVISED AND TO MAKE IT CONCRETE TO A POINT THAT OFFERS INSTITUTIONAL OUTLINES. IN THAT RESPECT IT IS CERTAINLY TOO EARLY TODAY, MR. MONIAC, TO SAY THIS WILL BE NEGOTIATED HERE AND NOT THERE. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO AGREE WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE ON ONE POINT, A PRIORI THERE IS MORE THAT SPEAKS AGAINST MBFR THAN FOR IT. THIS, IF YOU WISH, WAS THE ARMS CONTROL OUTLINE OF THE DECISION OF THE FEDERAL UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 04 BONN 06860 05 OF 05 140218Z

SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH HAD EXPRESSLY STIPULATED THAT WE, AFTER THE DECISION AND AFTER THE ARMS CONTROL OFFER OF

NATO, WOULD NEGOTIATE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF MBFR.
AND THIS, ULTIMATELY, BECAUSE NOT ONLY THE QUESTION
OF THE SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS IN MBFR BUT ALSO THE SPECIFIC
NATURE OF THESE WEAPONS, GIVE RISE TO QUESTIONS THAT DO
NOT EASILY FIT INTO MBFR. BUT IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE UN-
WISE IF I TODAY WOULD EXCLUDE, ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, MBFR AS A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSIONS.
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